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On the Overlap Between Everything and Nothing
Abstract. Graham Priest has recently proposed a solution to the problem
of the One and the Many which involves inconsistent objects and a non-
transitive identity relation. We show that his solution entails either that
the object everything is identical with the object nothing or that they are
mutual parts; depending on whether Priest goes for an extensional or a
non-extensional mereology.
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Introduction
It all starts with the problem of the One and the Many: what turns
a collection of objects into a unity? Take an object with parts (i.e., a
‘partite’ object). It is one, since it is an object and you can individually
refer to it. But it is also many, since it is composed by a collection of
other objects  its parts. Then, here is the problem: how do the parts
form a whole? What accounts for the unity of the whole?
Various solutions have been proposed but, according to Priest, all
these solutions run into the vicious Bradley regress. To make clear what
this regress is, let us call that which constitutes the parts as a single unit
‘collante’. Suppose we have a unity made up of a and b. Then, there
is something, the collante, which binds them together. But now, what
binds a, b, and the collante together? This must be some other collante,
or super-collante. And now we are off to a vicious infinite regress:
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Our original problem was how a unity of parts is possible. We need an
explanation. Given a bunch of parts, simply invoking another object
does not do this. [Priest, 2014b, p. 11]
Priest’s solution abandons two key assumptions of the debate, namely
that any solution has to be consistent and that identity is transitive. The
first assumption is abandoned by the introduction of gluons, which are
inconsistent objects. This forces Priest to accept a non-transitive notion
of identity. Besides this, Priest also uses a non-well-founded mereology.
However, as we will show, a consequence of Priest’s solution is that every
object is inconsistent. This in turn implies that the objects everything
and nothing are either parts of each other or identical.
We explain Priest’s theory of gluons and his non-standard notion
of identity in Section 1, and focus on his mereology in Section 2. In
Section 3 we explain why gluon theory entails that every object is in-
consistent. Section 4 is then concerned with the consequences for the
mereological structure of everything and nothing. If Priest’s mereology
is extensional, then everything and nothing are identical. If it is not
extensional, but strongly supplemented, then everything and nothing
are mutual parts. We conclude that everything and nothing are more
intimately related in Priest’s theory than one might have thought.
1. Gluon theory
According to Priest, what constitutes the unity of an object is its gluon.
Gluons are conceived to be identical to all and only the parts of the
unified object. Therefore, there is no metaphysical space between the
gluon and the parts of the objects. There is no need to ask how it is
possible that the gluon and the parts of the object are joined together,
because the gluon is the parts. Hence, Bradley’s regress is stopped. Here
we give a brief introduction of gluon theory and explain how gluons solve
the unity problem. Gluon theory can be built in six steps.
Step one: noneism. Noneism [Priest, 2016] is the view that some
objects do not exist. Fictional characters and failed objects of scientific
postulation are some examples of non-existent objects. For Priest, to be
an object is to be identical to something, hence being a possible object of
reference, or having at least one property, is sufficient for being an object.
The domain of objects includes both existent and non-existent ob-
jects. We can quantify over objects by using the particular and the
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universal quantifiers, ‘S’ and ‘A’ respectively. ‘SxPx’ has to be read
as ‘some x is such that Px’, in contrast to the now standard reading of
‘∃xPx’ as ‘there exists an x such that Px’. In addition to this, we have an
existence predicate, ‘E’, to signify that the object exists  which, for the
record, Priest takes to be equivalent with having the potentiality to enter
into causal relations [Priest, 2014b, p. xxii]. Thus, if we want to say that
there exists something that is P , we should write ‘Sx(Ex ∧ Px)’. More-
over, we use the same symbols for second-order universal and particular
quantifiers, which range over properties. Thus ‘SX Xa’ and ‘AY Y b’
are read as ‘some property X is had by object a’ and ‘all properties Y
are had by object b’, respectively.
Step two: dialetheism. Dialetheism [Priest et al., 2018] is the view
that some contradictions are true, i.e., some sentences are both true and
false. Given dialetheism one has to endorse a paraconsistent logic  like
LP [Priest, 2002, 2006]  in order to avoid triviality.
Step three: inconsistent objects. An object x is inconsistent (Ix) iff
it has at least one contradictory property, Y , i.e., iff x is in the extension
and anti-extension of at least one predicate Y . Formally:
(IO) Ix iff SY (Y x ∧ ¬Y x)
As we will show, an inconsistent object both is and is not an object
because it is identical to something while it is also not identical to any-
thing.
Step four: identity. Priest uses the standard Leibnizian definition of
identity:
(ID) a = b iff AX(Xa ≡ Xb)
The material biconditional Xa ≡ Xb that is used in this definition is
understood as defined as (¬Xa ∨ Xb) ∧ (¬Xb ∨ Xa) and since the un-
derlying logic is LP, the biconditional is reflexive, symmetric and non-
transitive. Identity inherits all these properties from the biconditional.
To get a feeling for LP and to show that transitivity really does not
follow, consider the property of being identical with c, i.e., ‘x = c’. Here
is an example showing that although a = b and b = c, we do not have
a = c. The crucial assumption is that we also have b 6= c (so b is an
inconsistent object). Applying the definition of identity to a and b, we
have (a 6= c ∨ b = c) ∧ (b 6= c ∨ a = c). Since the first disjunct of the
second conjunct is true, the second conjunct is true. This means we do
not have to conclude that a = c in order for the second conjunct to be
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true. Hence there is an interpretation according to which a 6= c even
though a = b and b = c are both true. (Of course, if a, b, and c are all
consistent objects, then identity is transitive.)
Step five: properties. Under an abundant conception of property,
any condition containing a single variable expresses a property. How-
ever, for Priest this conception is problematic since he thinks that there
are many examples of such conditions that do not specify a property.
For example, ‘being red and Paris is in France’ or ‘x = x or Caesar was
a frog’ [Priest, 2014b, p. 24]. Therefore, Priest operates with a sparser
notion of property, although he admits being unable to give necessary
and sufficient conditions for determining whether a predicate expresses
a property or not. But he does give some useful constraints. A condition
with a free variable does not determine a property if its truth conditions
at an index of evaluation (world, time, etc.) make reference to another
index of evaluation. (This means, roughly, that open sentences contain-
ing intensional operators do not specify a property.) The reason is that in
intensional contexts truth is not preserved by the material conditional 
not even in consistent cases. For example, ‘Giorgio believes that x is
happy’ does not express a property because Giorgio can believe this of
Clark Kent without believing it of Superman. Other conditions may or
may not express a property. So much for properties.
Step six: gluons. Let ‘<’ express the parthood relation. For now we
follow Priest in staying neutral on whether this is parthood or proper
parthood [Priest, 2014b, p. 20, fn. 7]. Given any composite or ‘partite’
object u, Priest defines its gluon, g(u), written also as gu, as an object
which is identical to all and only the parts of u. Formally:
(G) y = gu iff Ax(x < u ↔ y = x)
1
This tells us about the gluon of a partite object. What about the gluon
of a simple object? In that case the gluon is the simple object itself. We
may call it an ‘improper gluon’ to distinguish it from the proper gluon of
a partite object. And what about the unity of gluons themselves? Priest
takes gluons to be simples, i.e., non-partite objects. Thus, the gluon is
its own gluon and thus does not have any proper part.
Besides the distinction between proper and improper gluon, Priest
also distinguishes between prime and non-prime gluons. A prime gluon
1 We take A ↔ B as defined by (A → B) ∧ (B → A) and we assume that → is
the conditional of BX or some stronger relevant logic, in line with what Priest says
in [2014a].
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is a gluon which has all the properties of every part of the object that it
unites. A non-prime gluon is a gluon that is not prime.
Let us now note some important facts about gluons, which also show
that gluons are contradictory entities.
(F1) Every gluon is self-identical.
(F2) Every object has its gluon as a part.
(F3) For every object, its gluon is unique.
(F4) Every gluon of a partite object is not self-identical.
(F5) Every gluon of a partite object is inconsistent.
(F6) For every partite object, the gluon of the object is numerically
distinct from each of the object’s parts.
(F7) The gluon of a partite object is and is not an object.
(F8) For every partite object, the gluon of the object is not part of the
object.
Most of these facts are proven by Priest.2 (F8) is novel; it follows from
(G) and either (F4) or (F6) using modus tollens. Note also that (F7) iff
(F5). Consider left-to-right first. Assume (F7), then given the definition
of being an object we have Sx(x = gu) ∧Ax(x 6= gu); hence (F5) follows
if you take the property expressed by “is identical to something”. The
other direction is equal to the proof of (F7). So talking about inconsistent
objects is the same as talking about objects that are also non-objects,
2 (F1) follows immediately from the reflexivity of identity.
(F2) follows from (F1) and (G).
For (F3): Suppose that gu and g
′
u
are gluons of the same object. Then, we get
gu < u and g
′
u




For (F4): Let u be a partite object. Then, it has at least two distinct proper
parts, p1 and p2. Since p1 6= p2, there must be at least one property X such that
Xp1 ∧ ¬Xp2 (or vice versa). From (G) we get gu = p1 and gu = p2. Then, from (ID)
it follows that SX(Xgu ∧ ¬Xgu), therefore ¬AX(Xgu ≡ Xgu), therefore gu 6= gu.
(The proof is from [Zolghadr, 2019, p. 72].)
For (F5): Consider the property expressed by “to be identical to something”,
which according to Priest expresses the property of being an object. Then, as Priest
[2014b, pp. 20–21] notes, from (F1), (F4) and (IO) it follows that gu is inconsistent.
For (F6): Let u be a partite object with only two proper parts, p1 and p2 (the
proof immediately extends to objects with an arbitrary number of proper parts). As
we know, since p1 6= p2 there must be at least one property X such that Xp1 ∧ ¬Xp2
(or vice versa). Thus, Xgu ∧ ¬Xgu and hence ¬(Xp1 ≡ Xgu) and ¬(Xp2 ≡ Xgu).
Therefore, p1 6= gu and p2 6= gu [Priest, 2014b, p. 22].
(F7) follows immediately from (F1) and (F4) given that Priest takes the property
of being an object to be equivalent to the property of being self-identical.
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which in turn is the same as talking about objects that are not self-
identical.
Finally, we focus on two peculiar objects of gluon theory: everything
(i.e., e) and nothing (i.e., n). We can think of e as “the totality of every
object” [Priest, 2014b, p. 54], i.e., the object that every object is a part
of. As Priest notes, it is an inconsistent object. For, since every gluon
of a partite object is an object, it is part of e; but since every such gluon
is not an object, it is not part of e. Then, e both has and does not have
every such gluon as a part. Therefore, e is inconsistent. Moreover, given
Priest’s mereological perspective, e is the fusion of every object. Given
noneism, he embraces a version of Unrestricted Composition according
to which any collection of objects has a fusion. Bear in mind, though,
that such a fusion need not exist, since existence is a predicate of only
some objects. Priest uses ‘
⊕
Σ’ for a fusion of all and only the members
of a set Σ. Since “
⊕
Σ” is a noun phrase, Priest takes it to refer to
something. Thus, for any Σ,
⊕
Σ is an object. Instead of using sets,
we will officially use plural variables and use ‘
⊕
yy’ for the fusion of the
yys. Plural logic extends first-order logic with plural variables, plural
terms, and the is-one-of relation (≺) which takes a singular term on its
left-hand-side and a plural term on its right-hand-side. (However, for
readability we will sometimes follow Priest in using set theory instead of
plural logic.)
Nothing is “the absence of every thing” [Priest, 2014b, p. 55]. As for
e, n is an object since we can refer to it.3 Besides, n is an inconsistent
object. For since it is an object it is something, but it is the absence of
all things too. So n is nothing, i.e., n is not something. Therefore, n
is inconsistent. Priest defines n as the fusion of the empty set,
⊕
∅.4
(Actually, as will become clear, the definite article ‘the’ needs to be
replaced by the indefinite article ‘a’.) It has no parts for it is nothing.
Since n has no parts it is simple and it is thus its own gluon. n is an
improper part of itself, n ≤ n, but it is also not identical with itself and
3 Nothing’s objecthood is controversial. ‘Nothing’ is often not regarded as a
(referring) term but rather as as a quantifier. For discussion of Priest’s argument
that ‘nothing’ is a term [see Sgaravatti and Spolaore, 2018]. Here we simply follow
Priest, for sake of the argument, in taking ‘nothing’ to refer to the object nothing.
4 It is worth noting that there are other possible definitions of nothing. For
example, Casati and Fujikawa [2019] define it as the mereological complement of
everything, which brings about different features compared to those displayed within
Priest’s account.
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hence not an improper part of itself, ¬ n ≤ n [Priest, 2014a, p. 154].
Such claims about parthood bring us to mereology.
2. Mereology for gluon theory
Mereology is the study of the parthood relation.5 It is common to dis-
tinguish between two senses of parthood: improper parthood and proper
parthood. The first is the limiting case of the second: every object is an
improper part of itself. From hereon, we explicitly use ‘<’ for the proper
parthood relation and ‘≤’ for improper parthood.
Priest wants to allow for parthood loops, because prime gluons can
be proper parts of themselves.6 This means that proper parthood is
not asymmetric and improper parthood is not antisymmetric. So his
mereology is not well-founded.
Priest’s axiomatisation takes proper parthood as primitive and de-
fines (improper) parthood and overlap thus:
Parthood: x ≤ y iff x < y ∨ x = y
Overlap: x ◦ y iff Sz(z ≤ x ∧ z ≤ y)
Priest takes proper parthood to be transitive and accepts an extension-
ality principle according to which overlapping all the same objects is
sufficient for identity:
Transitivity: (x < y ∧ y < z) → x < z
Extensionality: Az(z ◦ x ↔ z ◦ y) → x = y
Using overlap and the epsilon operator, ‘εy’ (to be read as ‘an object y
such that’) one can define the notion of mereological sum,
⊕
zz, as
εyAx(x ◦ y ↔ Sz(z ≺ zz ↔ x ◦ z))
The mereological sum operation is taken by Priest to be unique and
unrestricted  the caveat here is that just because any two or more ob-
jects have a unique sum does not mean that this sum exists, for being a
noneist Priest takes existence to be different from being an object.
5 For more on mereology, see for a start [Lando, 2017; Varzi, 2019].
6 Consider a situation where a prime gluon g of y is also part of some part of
y, say x. Then, x has the property having g as a proper part. Thus, g also has the
property having g as a proper part, i.e., g < g [Priest, 2014b, p. 89].
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In the previous section we saw that the gluon of an object is identical
with all the parts of the object. This is a kind of one–many identity that
might remind some readers of the Composition as Identity debate [see
for a survey Carrara and Lando, 2021]. According to the strong version
of Composition as Identity (CAI), a whole is literally identical to all its
parts (taken collectively), i.e.:
(CAI) x =
⊕
yy → x = yy
Note that some might consider the consequent ill-formed, but defenders
of CAI commonly hold that identity can be flanked by both singular
and plural terms. A central result in that debate is that CAI results in a
collapse of the parthood relation onto the is-one-of relation (≺) of plural
logic [Sider, 2007, pp.57–58]:
x =
⊕
yy → (z ≤ x ↔ z ≺ yy)
This has various consequences that many are unwilling to swallow [see,
e.g., Calosi, 2016; Loss, 2018; Sider, 2014]. Fortunately for Priest, his
mereology does not result in Collapse (or its set-theoretic analogue), as
we will now show.
One derivation from CAI to Collapse uses the following intuitive
principle:
(Plural Covering) z ≤ x → Syy(x =
⊕
yy ∧ z ≺ yy)
(This says that if z is part of x then x is the fusion of some yy and z
is one of yy.) The argument from CAI and Plural Covering to Collapse
then goes as follows. Suppose x is the fusion of the yy. Then, from
right-to-left is easy: let z be one of yy, then by the definition of sum, z
is part of x. For the left-to-right direction, suppose z is part of x. Then
by Covering, there are some ww such that x is the sum of ww and z is
one of ww. By CAI, x = yy and x = ww. Thus by the transitivity of
identity, yy = ww. Hence, since z is one of ww, z is one of yy.
The left-to-right direction does not go through in Priest’s account,
for two reasons. One, gluon theory does not entail that x, or the gluon of
x, is one–many identical to all the parts of x taken collectively, instead
the gluon is identical to each part. Second, even if it were to entail that,
we would still need the transitivity of plural identity to conclude that
yy = ww (or, equivalently, that the set of yy has the same members
as the set of ww). But if singular identity is not transitive, there is no
reason why plural identity would be transitive.
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A reason we bring this up is that Takashi Yagisawa’s [2017] alter-
native gluon theory does fall prey to Collapse because in this case the
gluon of x is one–many identical to all the proper parts of x.7 How-
ever, there is nonetheless a problem with Priest’s mereology. As Aaron
Cotnoir [2018] explains, Priest’s rejection of anti-symmetry of parthood
means that he has to give up Extensionality or Transitivity (because
the latter two entail anti-symmetry: if x and y are parts of each other,
then they overlap the same objects, hence, by Extensionality, they are
identical). The solution Cotnoir suggests is to replace Extensionality
with the following:
(Strong Supplementation) Az(z ◦ x → z ◦ y) → x ≤ y
Instead of giving up Extensionality, Priest could give up Transitivity.
But we think this would make mereology redundant given that Priest
accepts a paraconsistent non-well-founded set theory according to which
sets are extensional and set formation is unrestricted [Priest, 2006, Ch. 3].
So if we take parthood to be non-transitive while leaving the fusion op-
eration as both unrestricted and extensional, then the parthood relation
will exhibit the exact same formal features as the membership relation
in Priest’s set theory. So calling an object a set or a fusion, or saying
that it has a part or an element, will then be merely a verbal difference.
In Section 4 we will see that there is another good reason for Priest
to follow Cotnoir’s advice which has everything to do with nothing.
3. Every object is inconsistent
In this section we will show that gluon theory entails that every object is
inconsistent. As far as we know, the first to point this out were Filippo
Casati and Naoya Fujikawa in their review of One [Casati and Fujikawa,
2014]. We reconstruct their argument here. Casati and Fujikawa men-
tion both everything and a version of unrestricted mereological composi-
tion. Actually, one can use either to get the conclusion that every object
is inconsistent.
Casati and Fujikawa [2014, p. 503] note that “according to gluon the-
ory and the unrestricted mereological sum operation, almost every object
7 For a more elaborate comparison of the two gluon theories, see also Priest’s
[2017] reply to Yagisawa.
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is contradictory.” We take their argument to be as follows. Consider the
object e, i.e., everything. By definition:
(CF1) Ax(x < e ∨ x = e)
Now, according to Priest [2014b, p. 55], e is inconsistent object:
(CF2) Ie
Moreover, e is a partite object, so it has a gluon [Priest, 2014b, p. 55],
ge, which  as shown in Section 1  is identical and not identical to each
of e’s proper parts:
(CF3) Ax(x < e → (x = ge ∧ x 6= ge))
So, x is in the extension and in the anti-extension of the property of
being identical with ge. Thus, by the definition of inconsistent object:
(CF4) Ax(x < e → Ix)
Hence, from CF1, CF2, and CF4:
(CF5) AxIx
Thus, every object is inconsistent. However, Casati and Fujikawa write
that “almost every object is contradictory” (our italics). We were unsure
which objects would lie outside the scope of their argument. But a
reviewer for this journal noted that if monism is true and there is only
one object, then this object is simple (it is its own gluon) and then it
does not follow that this lonely object is inconsistent, i.e., (CF2) would
be false. However, if everything is the only object there is, it follows that
either nothing does not exist  otherwise there are two objects  or that
everything and nothing are one and the same object. Note that monism
and noneism make strange bed partners. According to noneism, there
are non-existing objects. According to monism there is only one object.
Hence, unless noneism is only vacuously true, this combination of views
entails that the only thing there is, is a non-existing object. One way
out of this particular problem would be to define monism as the view
according to which only one object exists, while allowing for various non-
existing objects. But in that case, everything is again a partite object
which has one proper part that exists  the only existing object  and
various non-existing proper parts. In that case, Casati and Fujikawa’s
argument goes through as before.
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Casati and Fujikawa’s argument depends on there being an object
that is the mereological sum of every object. But the same conclusion
can be derived without using e, at least if there are two distinct objects.
Take two distinct objects, x and y. By unrestricted composition, they
have a fusion, z. Now, z has a gluon, gz, such that x = gz and y = gz.
But, since the gluon of z is also not an object, x 6= gz and y 6= gz.
Hence, x is and is not identical to gz and x is thus an inconsistent
object. (And similarly for y.) But this still leaves it open whether z is
an inconsistent object. Note that the gluon of z both is and is not a part
of z. Hence, z both has and does not have gz as a part, and z is thus
also inconsistent. Now, by generalising the argument we get that every
object is inconsistent.
We think this result comes as a surprise to many. Priest seems to
think that some objects are consistent. For example, he writes that
the transitivity of identity holds for consistent objects [Priest, 2014b,
p. 20] and he writes that the non-identity of gluons “should hardly be
the case for everything” [Priest, 2014b, p. 24]. We do not, however,
see an obvious way to block this argument. The only way, it seems, to
resist the argument is to object that mereological relations and (non-
)identity relations do not express legitimate properties  for whatever
reason. Indeed, Priest seems to suggest this at some places [Priest,
2014b, p. 24 fn. 15].
However, such properties are often invoked in One. For example,
Priest explicitly notes that being identical with something is usually
ruled out as a property in a Leibnizian definition of identity because
of triviality but that he need not rule this out, he explains, because the
biconditional is non-detachable in LP [Priest, 2014b, p. 20, fn. 4]. As
another example, Priest characterizes ‘being an object’ as being identical
to something:
What I take being to mean here is being an object  that is [. . . ], being
identical to something. Something is an object iff it has properties. For
if it has properties, it is certainly an object; and if it is an object, it has
properties  at least the property of being an object.
[Priest, 2014b, p. 49]
Similarly, his argument against the asymmetry of proper parthood uses
the property of having a gluon as a proper part [Priest, 2014b, p. 89].
More generally, Priest is committed to a characterization principle ac-
cording to which for any condition Px there is some object at some
12 Massimiliano Carrara, Filippo Mancini, Jeroen Smid
(possible or impossible) world which satisfies Px [2014b, p. xxii–xxiii].
A very sparse notion of property would run counter to this. If mereo-
logical predicates fail to express properties, then it is unclear how Priest
would characterize, for example, the object e, since this object is defined
as the object that has every thing as a part. For these reasons we will not
try to resist the argument. Instead we want to see where the conclusion
leads: what follows from the claim that every object is inconsistent?
4. Everything and nothing are mutual parts
The fact that every object is inconsistent has far-reaching consequences
for the part–whole structure of objects because, if Extensionality holds,
it follows that everything is identical to nothing, i.e., e = n. Remember,
e is defined as the fusion of every object, whereas n is the fusion of the
empty set. Given the definition of the empty set, an equivalent definition
of n is that it is a fusion of all non-objects [Priest, 2014a, p. 156]. Thus,
n =
⊕
{x : x 6= x} and e =
⊕
{x : x = x}.8 Now, from Section 3 we
know that every object is inconsistent, which, as we know from Section
1, means that every object is both self-identical and not self-identical:
Ax(x = x ∧ x 6= x). Thus, every object is a part of e and every object
is a part of n, i.e., e and n have the same parts. That is to say that
every object that overlaps e overlaps with n and vice versa. So, by the
definition of fusion and the fact that fusions are, for Priest [2014b, p. 90],
unique, e = n.
Note, however, that it is also still the case that e 6= n since n is simple
whereas e is not simple [Zolghadr, 2019]; n is simple because it does not
have any object as a proper part, while e is not simple because every
other object is a proper part of it.
The obvious way out of this conclusion is to drop Extensionality 
something Priest has to do anyway if he wants a non-well-founded mere-
ology [Cotnoir, 2018] as explained in Section 2. If we replace Extension-
ality with Strong Supplementation we do not get that e = n, but we
do get that e and n are parts of each other, i.e., e ≤ n and n ≤ e. In
that case it follows that e < n and n < e (by the definition of improper
8 Since we are officially using plural logic instead of set theory as our background
logic for mereology, these definitions are inadequate for us. We should define n as⊕
yy Ay (y ≺ yy ↔ y 6= y), and similarly for e. But for readability we follow Priest’s
definition.
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parthood and that e 6= n and not also e = n). Maybe this is a more
palatable consequence.
Dropping Extensionality comes at a price though. It means that
for any collection yy there may be more than one fusion of it. A non-
extensional mereology does not provide any guidance on the number of
fusions that can be formed from a single set of objects. So, in principle,
there are infinitely many numerically distinct fusions of the same collec-
tion yy. In particular, there may be infinitely many distinct fusions that
are all fusions of the set {x : x = x} and infinitely many distinct fusions
that are all fusions of the set {x : x 6= x}, and all these fusions would be
parts of each other (by Strong Supplementation and the fact that every
object is inconsistent).
As a toy example to illustrate the problem of dropping Extensionality,
consider a fusion of the set {x : x = e ∨ x = n}, i.e., a fusion of e and
n. Is this object identical with e, with n, with both, or with neither?
The mereology no longer tells us because Extensionality does not hold.
Neither can we simply apply Priest’s Leibnizian definition of identity
because even if we would know the properties of e and n, we would not
yet know which of these properties are (not) had by
⊕
{x : x = e∨x = n}.
Notice also that if e and n are mutual parts then the gluon of e is
identical with the gluon of n. To see this, note that n is part of e and
hence ge = n. Since gn is part of n and n is part of e, by the transitivity
of parthood, gn is part of e. And since ge is identical with all of e’s
parts: ge = gn. Hence, since the gluon of an object is its being [Priest,
2014b, p. 51], the being of everything is the same as the being of nothing.
Moreover, the gluon of nothing is also identical with everything. The
reason is that e is a proper part of n and since gn is identical to each
proper part of n, gn = e. (Similar reasoning shows that the gluon of
everything is identical with nothing.) Finally, we also have ge = e,
because e is a proper part of e by the transitivity of proper parthood.
Furthermore, it seems that both ge and gn are prime. Priest explains
the primeness of ge on [2014b, p. 55]. The primeness of gn follows from
the definition of being prime: a gluon of x is prime if it has all the
properties that each of the parts of x has. Since n does not have any
parts, its gluon (vacuously) has all the properties of all the parts of n.
The appendix contains figures and tables showing in what way proper
parthood and identity behave given that every object is inconsistent and
how this is different from what Priest seems to suggest in One.
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5. Conclusion
We have shown that there are two ways to make Casati and Fujikawa
argument for the inconsistency of every object precise. This means that
Priest’s gluon theory is committed to the claim that every object both is
and is not an object. The main consequence of this is, as we have shown,
that either everything is identical with nothing or that everything and
nothing are parts of each other. The first disjunct holds if Priest goes for
an extensional mereology, whereas the second disjunct holds if he drops
Extensionality and instead accepts Strong Supplementation. We think
that Priest would prefer the latter, especially because  as Cotnoir [2018]
argued  this is the best way to have a non-well-founded mereology. We
ended with a short discussion about the drawbacks of leaving behind
the plains of extensionality. The only alternative to avoid the conclusion
that every object is inconsistent (and the consequences of this claim),
seems to be by going for a very sparse notion of property. However,
this runs counter to the account of intentionality that Priest favours,
which includes a characterization principle that provides an object (in
a possible or impossible world) that has the properties that are used to
describe it. Regardless of Priest’s preferred mereology, we suspect that
even those Meinongians who are sympathetic to dialetheism may find it
hard to accept that every object is inconsistent or that everything and
nothing are mutual parts (or even identical).
Appendix: Figures and Tables
In this appendix we present two figures and two tables. The figures
represent the proper parthood relation and the tables represent the iden-
tity relation. Both figures presents proper parthood relations. Figure 1
shows how (we think that) Priest takes the proper parthood relation to
behave. Square nodes represent consistent objects and round nodes rep-
resent inconsistent objects. Arrows represent proper parthood relations
and an arrow is dashed if the objects stand both in the extension and
anti-extension of the proper parthood relation. Figure 2 represent the
situation resulting from the fact that every object is inconsistent and
assuming that Extensionality fails but Strong Supplementation holds.
Table 1 shows how Priest takes the identity relation to behave in the
case corresponding to the first figure. ‘+’ signals that the objects are








Figure 2. Priest’s actual model for proper parthood, where e and n have the
same gluon, g
identical, ‘−’ signals that they are not identical, and ‘±’ signals that
they are and are not identical. ‘∗’ signals that although we know that
the objects are in the anti-extension of the identity relation, it is unclear
whether the objects also stand in the extension.9
Table 2 shows how the identity relation behaves in the case repre-
sented by the second figure.
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= e n a b ge gn
e ± − − − −∗ −
n − ± − − − ±
a − − + − ± −
b − − − + ± −
ge −
∗ − ± ± ± −
gn − ± − − − ±
Table 1. Priest’s preferred model for identity
= e n a b ge gn
e ± − − − ± ±
n − ± − − ± ±
a − − ± − ± ±
b − − − ± ± ±
ge ± ± ± ± ± ±
gn ± ± ± ± ± ±
Table 2. Priest’s actual model for identity
anonymous reviewers for comments on previous drafts. Jeroen gratefully
acknowledges funding from the Swedish Research Council (VR project
number 2017-06160-3) as well as the Netherlands Organisation for Sci-
entifc Research (NWO, project number VI.Veni.201F.006: The Whole
Explanation, Part by Part).
References
Calosi, C., 2016, “Composition as identity and mereological nihilism”, The
Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263): 219–235. DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqv109
Carrara, M., and G. Lando, 2021, “Mereology and identity”, Synthese 198 (18):
4205–4227. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-020-02592-5
On the overlap between everything and nothing 17
Casati, F., and N. Fujikawa, 2014, “Review of Graham Priest, One: Being
an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the
Singular Object which is Nothingness”, Logic and Logical Philosophy 23 (4):
499–508. DOI: 10.12775/LLP.2014.013
Casati, F., and N. Fujikawa, 2019, “Nothingness, meinongianism and inconsis-
tent mereology”, Synthese 196 (9): 3739–3772. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-017-
1619-1
Cotnoir, A. J., 2018, “A note on Priest’s mereology”, The Australasian Journal
of Logic 15 (4): 642–645. DOI: 10.26686/ajl.v15i4.4832
Lando, G., 2017, Mereology: A Philosophical Introduction, Bloomsbury Press.
Loss, R., 2018, “A sudden collapse to nihilism”, The Philosophical Quarterly
68 (271): 370–375. DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqx012
Priest, G., 2002, “Paraconsistent logic”, pages 287–393 in Handbook of Philo-
sophical Logic, Springer.
Priest, G., 2006, In Contradiction, Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.
1093/acprof:oso/9780199263301.001.0001
Priest, G., 2014a, “Much ado about nothing”, The Australasian Journal of
Logic 11 (2). DOI: 10.26686/ajl.v11i2.2144
Priest, G., 2014b, One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and
of its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness, Oxford:
Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199688258.001.
0001
Priest, G., 2016, Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Inten-
tionality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/
9780198783596.001.0001
Priest, G., 2017, “Entangled gluons: Replies to Casati, Han, Kim, and Yagi-
sawa”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (4): 560–568. DOI:
10.1080/09672559.2017.1352271
Priest, G., F. Berto, and Z. Weber, 2018, “Dialetheism”, in E. N. Zalta (ed.),
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stan-
ford University, fall 2018 edition. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
dialetheism/
Sgaravatti, D., and G. Spolaore, 2018, “Out of nothing”, Thought: A Journal
of Philosophy 7 (2): 132–138. DOI: 10.1002/tht3.274
Sider, T., 2007, “Parthood”, The Philosophical Review 116 (1): 51–91. DOI:
10.1215/00318108-2006-022
18 Massimiliano Carrara, Filippo Mancini, Jeroen Smid
Sider, T., 2014, “Consequences of collapse”, chapter 11 in A. J. Cotnoir and
D. L. M. Baxter (eds.), Composition as Identity, Oxford: Oxford University
Press. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669615.003.0011
Varzi, A., 2019, “Mereology”, in E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, spring 2019
edition. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology/
Yagisawa, T., 2017, “Gluons of different colors”, International Journal of Philo-
sophical Studies 25 (4): 555–559. DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2017.1352267
Zolghadr, B., 2019, “Being and nothingness”, The Australasian Journal of Logic
16 (3): 68–82. DOI: 10.26686/ajl.v16i3.4075
Massimiliano Carrara and Filippo Mancini
FISPPA Department




Institute of Logic, Language and Computation
University of Amsterdam
the Netherlands
j.smid@uva.nl
